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PAPER
Secret Key Agreement by Soft-decision of Signals in
Gaussian Maurer’s Model∗
Masashi NAITO†a), Nonmember, Shun WATANABE††b), Ryutaroh MATSUMOTO††c),
and Tomohiko UYEMATSU††d), Members
SUMMARY We consider the problem of secret key agree-
ment in Gaussian Maurer’s Model. In Gaussian Maurer’s model,
legitimate receivers, Alice and Bob, and a wire-tapper, Eve, re-
ceive signals randomly generated by a satellite through three in-
dependent memoryless Gaussian channels respectively. Then Al-
ice and Bob generate a common secret key from their received
signals. In this model, we propose a protocol for generating a
common secret key by using the result of soft-decision of Alice
and Bob’s received signals. Then, we calculate a lower bound
on the secret key rate in our proposed protocol. As a result of
comparison with the protocol that only uses hard-decision, we
found that the higher rate is obtained by using our protocol.
key words: advantage distillation, AWGN, information theo-
retic security, key agreement, privacy amplification, public dis-
cussion
1. Introduction
As one of fundamental problems in cryptography, we
will consider the problem of secret key agreement in
this paper. That is to say, we will consider how to gen-
erate a common secret key by two parties not sharing
such a key initially in the situation that a wire-tapper
has access to the communication channel between two
parties. Many models of this problem were presented
and and analyzed in the literatures [1]–[4]. Recently,
key agreement over wireless channel is experimentally
studied [6].
Maurer [5] and Ahlswede and Csisz´ar [7] consid-
ered the interactive model of secret key agreement from
an initially shared partially secret string by communi-
cation over a public channel.
Maurer [5] considered the following model. Two
parties, Alice and Bob, who want to share a secret key,
and the wire-tapper, Eve, receive the bits randomly
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generated by a satellite over independent binary sym-
metric channels (BSC) respectively. We call this model
Maurer’s model. Maurer [5] proposed an interactive
protocol in his model, and he showed a lower bound
on key rates at which Alice and Bob can agree a secret
key. Note that the key rate is defined as length of the
secret key generated by Alice and Bob per channel use
by the satellite.
In Maurer’s original model and protocol, channels
are assumed to be BSC, and received signals are as-
sumed to be digital signals. However, signals in prac-
tical channels are analogue. Recently, key agreement
over wireless channel is experimentally studied by Aono
et al. [6]. However, information theoretic analysis of
the key agreement over analogue channels has not suf-
ficiently conducted. In order to close the gap between
Maurer’s results and the experimental study, we will
modify Maurer’s model to use Gaussian channels in-
stead of BSC, which we call Gaussian Maurer’s model.
In Gaussian Maurer’s model, Alice and Bob can
use the results of soft-decision of analogue received sig-
nals. They can determine the reliability information
from this results and use it for generating a common
secret key. In this paper, we will propose a protocol for
secret key agreement using the reliability information.
Then, we calculate key rates at which Alice and Bob
can agree a secret key in our proposed protocol.
Considering the situation that Alice, Bob, and Eve
hard-detect the signals that are sent out by the satel-
lite, Maurer’s original model can be seen as the special
case of Gaussian Maurer’s model. Thus, we can com-
pare the protocol in Gaussian Maurer’s model and one
in BSC Maurer’s model. In order to show advantage
to use reliability information, we will compare the key
rate in our proposed protocol and the key rate in Mau-
rer’s protocol in which Alice and Bob use only hard-
decision. that uses only hard-decision. From the result
of this comparison, we will show that the higher key
rate is obtained by using our proposed protocol than
the protocol that only uses hard-decision.
Rest of this paper is organized as follows. In sec-
tion 2, we will introduce Maurer’s model modified to
use Gaussian channels instead of BSC. In section 3, we
will show our proposed protocol using reliability infor-
mation. In section 4, we will compare our proposed
protocol and Maurer’s protocol with hard-decision. In
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appendices, we will prove the lemmas that is needed for
the proof of theorem that derives a lower bound on key
rates at which Alice and Bob can agree a secret key.
2. Secret Key Rate in Gaussian Maurer’s
Model
Consider the following key agreement problem, which
we call Gaussian Maurer’s model. Assume that a satel-
lite randomly generates signals and sends it to two par-
ties Alice and Bob who want to share secret key and
the wire-tapper Eve over three independent memory-
less Gaussian channels. Their noises at time i, denoted
N
(i)
A , N
(i)
B , and N
(i)
E , are drawn from independently
identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian distributions
with mean 0 and variances VA, VB, and VE respec-
tively. A sequence of signals that the satellite gener-
ates at time 1 to n, denoted Un = [U (1), . . . , U (n)],
is drawn from a distribution PUn on a signal set in
R
n and this sequence of signals satisfies power con-
straint 1
n
∑n
i=1(u
(i))2 ≤ 1 for all sequences un. Alice,
Bob, and Eve receive Xn = [X(1), . . . , X(n)], Y n =
[Y (1), . . . , Y (n)],and Zn = [Z(1), . . . , Z(n)], as outputs
of these three channels at time 1 to n respectively. They
are assumed to know the distribution PUn and noise
variances VA, VB, and VE . Note that capital letters de-
note random variables and corresponding small letters
denote realizations in this paper.
After Alice, Bob, and Eve receive signals, Alice and
Bob communicate over a public channel. This channel
is assumed to be noiseless and discrete, and its capacity
is finite. Every messages communicated between Alice
and Bob can be intercepted by Eve, but it is assumed
that Eve cannot fraudulent messages nor modify mes-
sages on this public channel without being detected.
Let C be the entire communication held over this public
channel. After enough communication over the public
channel, Alice computes a secret key S on a key al-
phabet S as a function of her received signals Xn and
all information C over the public channel. In a similar
way, Bob computes a secret key S′ on S as a function of
Y n and C. The secret key rate in this model is defined
as follows. Note that we will take all logarithms to be
base 2, and hence all the entropies will be measured in
bits.
Definition 1 For given noise variances VA, VB , and
VE , a rate R is said to be achievable if for every ǫ > 0
there exists a protocol for sufficiently large n satisfying
Pr[S 6= S′] ≤ ǫ, (1)
H(S|CZn) ≥ log |S| − ǫ (2)
and
1
n
log |S| ≥ R− ǫ, (3)
where |S| denotes the number of the elements in S.
Definition 2 The secret key rate for given noise vari-
ances VA, VB , and VE , denoted RS(VA, VB , VE), is the
supremum of all achievable rate.
3. Secret Key Agreement by Soft-Decision of
Signals
In this section, we will propose a protocol that uses
reliability information of signals and calculate a lower
bound on the secret key rate in this protocol.
In our proposed protocol, the satellite selects input
signal U (i) i.i.d. according to a distribution PU (1) =
PU (−1) = 12 . Thus, the received signals X(i), Y (i), Z(i)
are also i.i.d. respectively.
Let a1, . . . , aK be a positive monotonically increas-
ing sequence, and let E1, . . . , EK be sets, where jth
level set is defined as Ej = [−aj , aj] (j = 1, . . . ,K).
The procedures of our proposed protocol is as fol-
lows.
1. From the received signal X(i) at time i, Alice de-
termines reliability information W
(i)
A as
W
(i)
A =


0 if X(i) ∈ E1
j if X(i) ∈ Ecj\Ecj+1 (j = 1, . . . ,K)
K if X(i) ∈ EcK
,
where the set Ecj is the complementary set of the
set Ej in the set of real numbers R, and E
c
j\Ecj+1 =
Ecj ∩ Ej+1 is the difference set. Similarly, from
the received signal Y (i) at time i, Bob determine
reliability information W
(i)
B as
W
(i)
B =


0 if Y (i) ∈ E1
j if Y (i) ∈ Ecj\Ecj+1 (j = 1, . . . ,K)
K if Y (i) ∈ EcK
.
2. Alice and Bob send sequencesWnA = [W
(1)
A , . . . ,W
(n)
A ]
and WnB = [W
(1)
B , . . . ,W
(n)
B ] over the public chan-
nel. From these messages, they can know the sets
containing their received signals.
3. Alice and Bob quantize Xn and Y n into discrete
random variables X˜n∆ and Y˜
n
∆ , where X˜
(i)
∆ is de-
fined as
X˜
(i)
∆ =
{
1 if X(i) ≥ 0,
0 if X(i) < 0,
(4)
and Y˜
(i)
∆ is similarly defined as
Y˜
(i)
∆ =
{
1 if Y (i) ≥ 0,
0 if Y (i) < 0.
(5)
For given (W
(i)
A ,W
(i)
B ) = (wA, wB), if Eve’s
ambiguity H(X˜∆|Z,WA = wA,WB = wB) about
X˜
(i)
∆ is smaller than Bob’s ambiguity H(X˜∆|Y,WA =
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wA,WB = wB) about X˜
(i)
∆ , then we should dis-
card X˜
(i)
∆ in our protocol. Indeed, if we keep X˜
(i)
∆
for such (W
(i)
A ,W
(i)
B ) = (wA, wB), then a negative
term is added to the lower bound on a secret key
rate shown in Eq. (12). Furthermore, if the differ-
ence between Eve and Bob’s ambiguity about X˜
(i)
∆ is
smaller than the difference between Eve’s ambiguity
H(Y˜∆|Z,WA = wA,WB = wB) about Y˜ (i)∆ and Al-
ice’s ambiguity H(Y˜∆|X,WA = wA,WB = wB) about
Y˜
(i)
∆ , we should generate a secret key from Y˜
(i)
∆ in-
stead of X˜
(i)
∆ . For this purpose, we consider the sets
A,B ⊂ {1, . . . ,K} × {1, . . . ,K}, which are defined as
A = {(wA, wB)|
H(X˜∆|Z,WA = wA,WB = wB)
−H(X˜∆|Y,WA = wA,WB = wB)
≥ max{0, H(Y˜∆|Z,WA = wA,WB = wB)
−H(Y˜∆|X,WA = wA,WB = wB)}},
B = {(wA, wB)|
H(Y˜∆|Z,WA = wA,WB = wB)
−H(Y˜∆|X,WA = wA,WB = wB)
> max{0, H(X˜∆|Z,WA = wA,WB = wB)
−H(X˜∆|Y,WA = wA,WB = wB)}}.
If given (W
(i)
A ,W
(i)
B ) is in the set A, we use X˜
(i)
∆ for gen-
erating a secret key, otherwise we discard X˜
(i)
∆ . Simi-
larly, if given (W
(i)
A ,W
(i)
B ) is in the set B, we use Y˜
(i)
∆
for generating a secret key, otherwise we discard Y˜
(i)
∆ .
Thus, we determine discrete random variables
X
(i)
∆ =
{
X˜
(i)
∆ if (W
(i)
A ,W
(i)
B ) ∈ A,
0 otherwise,
(6)
and
Y
(i)
∆ =
{
Y˜
(i)
∆ if (W
(i)
A ,W
(i)
B ) ∈ B,
0 otherwise,
(7)
and we use them for generating a secret key instead of
X˜
(i)
∆ and Y˜
(i)
∆ .
4. According to the rule in Eq. (6), Alice determines
Xn∆ from W
n
A , W
n
B , and X˜
n
∆. Similarly, Bob deter-
mines Y n∆ from W
n
A , W
n
B, and Y˜
n
∆ .
5. Alice sends partial information of Xn∆ as a public
message MA on MA in order to share Xn∆ with
Bob. Similarly, Bob sends partial information of
Y n∆ as a public message MB on MB.
6. Alice decodesMB, X
n, and the reliability informa-
tion (WA,WB) into the estimation Yˆ
n
∆ . Similarly,
Bob decodes MA, Y
n, and the reliability informa-
tion (WA,WB), into the estimation Xˆ
n
∆.
7. Let F be a set of two-universal hash function [8]
(see also Appendix B.1) from {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n to
S. Alice randomly choose a hash function f ∈ F ,
and publicly tells the choice to Bob. Then, Alice
and Bob’s final keys are S = f(Xn∆, Yˆ
n
∆) and S
′ =
f(Xˆn∆, Y
n
∆) respectively.
In order to guarantee that Alice and Bob can com-
pute the same key in step 6, we set the rate 1
n
log |MA|
and 1
n
log |MB| of public messages according to the fol-
lowing lemma, which is derived by modifying “Slepian-
Wolf Coding” [9] for continuous random variables.
Lemma 1 Suppose that we set
1
n
log |MA| > H(X∆|YWAWB) (8)
and
1
n
log |MB| > H(Y∆|XWAWB), (9)
then there exist encoders and decoders such that the de-
coding error probabilities Pr{Xˆn∆ 6= Xn∆} and Pr{Yˆ n∆ 6=
Y n∆} tend to 0 as n→∞.
Thus, Eq. (1) is satisfied for sufficiently large n.
In order to guarantee the security of the protocol,
we set the key rate 1
n
log |S| according to the follow-
ing lemma, which is derived by modifying the so-called
“left over hash lemma” [10]–[12] for continuous random
variables.
Lemma 2 Suppose that we set
1
n
log |S| < H(X∆Y∆|ZWAWB)− 1
n
log |MA||MB|,
(10)
then
H(S|ZnWnAWnBMAMBF ) ≥ log |S| − ǫ (11)
is satisfied for sufficiently large n.
Note that F is a random variable on F , and all in-
formation C over the public channel correspond to
(WnA ,W
n
B ,MA,MB, F ) in this case.
From Eqs. (8)–(10), we obtain the following the-
orem that gives a lower bound on secret key rate
RS(VA, VB, VE) in this protocol.
Theorem 1 By using our proposed protocol, we
achieve the lower bound on the secret key rate
RS(VA, VB, VE) as
RS(VA, VB , VE)
≥ H(X∆Y∆|ZWAWB)−H(X∆|YWAWB)
−H(Y∆|XWAWB). (12)
Note that from the rule in Eqs. (6)–(7). ,we can rewrite
the Eq. (12) as
4
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Fig. 1 The relation between SNR and the key rate in our pro-
posed protocol for several NNR.
H(X∆Y∆|ZWAWB)−H(X∆|YWAWB)
−H(Y∆|XWAWB)
=
∑
wA,wB
PWAWB (wA, wB)
×max{0, H(X˜∆|Z,WA = wA,WB = wB)
−H(X˜∆|Y,WA = wA,WB = wB),
H(Y˜∆|Z,WA = wA,WB = wB)
−H(Y˜∆|X,WA = wA,WB = wB)}.
For fixed (WA,WB) = (wA, wB), H(X˜∆|Z,WA =
wA,WB = wB) − H(X˜∆|Y,WA = wA,WB = wB) is
lower bound on the secret key rate when we use only X˜n∆
for generating a secret key, H(Y˜∆|Z,WA = wA,WB =
wB) −H(Y˜∆|X,WA = wA,WB = wB) is lower bound
on the secret key rate when we use only Y˜ n∆ for gener-
ating a secret key, and 0 is trivial lower bound on the
secret key. By the rule in Eqs. (6)–(7), we choose the
maximum among these lower bounds on secret key rate
for each (wA, wB) in order to make the lower bound on
the secret key rate as high as possible.
Note that encoding in step 5 and decoding in step
6 are implementable by using low-density parity check
codes [13], [14].
4. Comparison to a Protocol with Hard-
Decision
In this section, we will show the relation between signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) and the key rate achieved by
our proposed protocol for several noise-to-noise ratio
(NNR). We will also show the comparisons between the
key rate achieved by our proposed protocol and the key
rate achieved by the protocol that Alice and Bob use
only hard-decision for generating a secret key.
The relation between (SNR) and the key rate
achieved by our proposed protocol for several NNR is
presented in Fig. 1, where sets E1, E2, and E3 are de-
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(c) SNR= 7[dB]
Fig. 2 The key rates achieved by our proposed protocol and
Maurer’s protocol.
termined from fixed a1 =
1
3 , a2 =
2
3 , a3 = 1 in our
proposed protocol. Note that SNR is defined as 1
VA
and NNR is defined as VE
VB
, and we assume VA = VB .
From this figure, we observe that we do not obtain a
high key rate when SNR is too high or too low.
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In order to show advantage to use soft-decision, we
compare the key rate achieved by our proposed protocol
and the key rate achieved by Maurer’s protocol in which
Alice and Bob use only hard-decision for generating a
secret key. The result of this comparison is presented
in Figs. 2(a)–2(c). In this comparison sets E1, E2, and
E3 are determined from fixed a1 =
1
3 , a2 =
2
3 , a3 = 1
in our proposed protocol, and the block length of rep-
etition code used in Maurer’s protocol is optimally se-
lected from 1 to 10 for each NNR. From these figures,
we observe that we obtain a larger key rate by our pro-
posed protocol than by Maurer’s protocol with all value
of NNR. Note that in Gaussian Maurer’s model, we
should calculate the key rate by Maurer’s protocol for
Eve who can use continuous random variables Zn to
guess the secret key. However, the numerical calcula-
tion of the key rate by Maurer’s protocol in Gaussian
Maurer’s model is difficult when the block length of rep-
etition code used in his protocol is 2 or larger. Thus, we
calculate the key rate in BSC Maurer’s model instead
of Gaussian Maurer’s model when the block length of
repetition code used in his protocol is 2 or larger. In the
calculation of the key rate in BSC Maurer’s model, we
consider the situation that Alice, Bob, and Eve hard-
detect received signals according to the similar rule as
in Eqs. (4) and (5). In this situation, we can convert
three Gaussian channels into independent binary sym-
metric channels with error probabilities ǫA, ǫB, ǫE given
by
ǫA =
1
2
erfc
(√ 1
VA
)
, ǫB =
1
2
erfc
(√ 1
VB
)
,
ǫE =
1
2
erfc
(√ 1
VE
)
, (13)
where the complementary error function erfc(z) is de-
fined as
erfc(z) =
2√
π
∫ ∞
z
e−t
2
. (14)
Note that this way of the comparison gives Maurer’s
protocol advantage because a wire-tapper in Gaussian
Maurer’s model is more powerful than in BSC Mau-
rer’s model.† Hence, the key rate achieved by Maurer’s
protocol in Gaussian Maurer’s model is lower than that
presented in Figs. 2(a)–2(c).
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed Gaussian Maurer’s
model and the protocol with reliability information
based on the result of the soft-decision in this model.
As a result, we have obtained a higher key rate than
Maurer’s protocol. This is because that the correlation
†The wire-tapper in BSC Maurer’s model can use con-
tinuous random variables Zn to guess the secret key, but
one in BSC Maurer’s model can only use quantized versions
of them.
betweenX∆ in Eq. (6) and Y and between Y∆ in Eq. (7)
and X obtained by using the reliability information is
stronger than the correlation between X˜∆ in Eq. (4)
and Y˜∆ in Eq. (5) obtained by using the hard-decision.
However, we do not know the optimal way to de-
termine sets E1, . . . , EK and its number K. Intuitively,
one may think that the more sets we use, the higher
rate we obtain. However, this intuition does not seem
to be always true. Actually, there exists the case that
we cannot obtain higher key rate though we use many
sets. Furthermore, we have to find the optimal signal
constellation used by the satellite. These problems are
future research agenda.
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Appendix A: Proof of lemma 1
We only prove that if we set the rate 1
n
log |MA| of pub-
lic message according to Eq. (8), then there exist en-
coders and decoders such that the decoding error prob-
abilities Pr{Xˆn∆ 6= Xn∆} tends to 0 as n → ∞. The
proof for the rate 1
n
log |MB| of public message follows
by symmetry.
We use the so-called “bin coding” proposed by
Cover [15] in this proof. The procedures of bin cod-
ing is as follows.
Assign every xn∆ ∈ Xn∆ to one of |MA| bins in-
dependently according to the uniform distribution on
MA.
Alice sends the index i of the bin to which xn∆
belongs. Then let ϕ¯n(x
n
∆) = i.
For each (yn,wn), we define the set Sn(y
n,wn) ⊂
Xn∆ as
Sn(y
n,wn)
:=
{
xn∆ :
1
n
log
1
PXn∆|Y n,Wn(x
n
∆|yn,wn)
≤ H(X∆|YW) + γ
}
,
where γ > 0 is an arbitrary fixed small constant, and we
denote the pair (WnA ,W
n
B) as W
n. Then, for given yn,
wn, and the received index i, declare ψ¯n(i, y
n,wn) =
xn∆ if there is one and only one pair (x
n
∆, y
n,wn) such
that ϕ¯n(x
n
∆) = i and x
n
∆ ∈ Sn(yn,wn). Otherwise,
declare an error.
We will evaluate the decoding error probability av-
eraged over randomly chosen encoders as follows. We
have an error if Xn∆ is not in Sn(Y
n,Wn) or if there
is another symbol xˆn∆ ∈ Xn∆ in the same bin. Thus, we
can define the events of error
6
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E(0)n := {Xn∆ /∈ Sn(Y n,Wn)},
E(1)n :=
{∃xˆn 6= Xn∆ : ϕ¯n(xˆn∆) = ϕ¯n(Xn∆)
and xˆn∆ ∈ Sn(Y n,Wn)
}
,
Then the decoding error probability averaged over ran-
domly chosen encoders Pr{Xn∆ 6= ψ¯n(ϕ¯n(Xn∆), Y n,Wn)}
is upper bounded as
Pr{Xn∆ 6= ψ¯n(ϕ¯n(Xn∆), Y n,Wn)}
= Pr{E(0)n ∪E(1)n }
≤ Pr{E(0)n }+ Pr{E(1)n }. (A· 1)
Pr{E(0)n } is evaluated as
Pr{E(0)n } = Pr{Xn∆ /∈ Sn(Y n,Wn)}
= Pr
{
1
n
log
1
PXn∆|Y nWn(X
n
∆|Y nWn)
> H(X∆|YW) + γ
}
= Pr
{
1
n
n∑
i=1
log
1
PX∆|YW(X
(i)
∆ |Y (i)W(i))
> H(X∆|YW) + γ
}
, (A· 2)
which tends to 0 as n → ∞ by the weak law of large
numbers. To bound Pr{E(1)n }, we rewrite it as
Pr{E(1)n }
= Pr
{∃xˆn∆ 6= Xn∆ : ϕ¯n(xˆn∆) = ϕ¯n(Xn∆)
and xˆn∆ ∈ Sn(Y n,Wn)
}
=
∫
Yn
pY n(y
n)
∑
(xn∆,w
n)∈Xn∆×W
n
A
×Wn
B
PXn∆Wn|yn(x
n
∆,w
n)gn(x
n
∆, y
n,wn) dyn, (A· 3)
where
gn(x
n
∆, y
n,wn)
= Pr
{∃xˆn∆ 6= xn∆ : ϕ¯n(xˆn∆) = ϕ¯n(xn∆)
and (xˆn∆) ∈ Sn(yn,wn)
}
. (A· 4)
Furthermore, we can rewrite (A· 4) as
gn(x
n
∆, y
n,wn) =
∑
xˆn∆ 6=x
n
∆
xˆn
∆
∈Sn(yn,wn)
Pr{ϕ¯n(xˆn∆) = ϕ¯n(xn∆)}
=
∑
xˆn∆ 6=x
n
∆
xˆn
∆
∈Sn(yn,wn)
1
|MA|
≤
∑
xˆn∆∈Sn(y
n,wn)
1
|MA|
=
|Sn(yn,wn)|
|MA| (A· 5)
If xˆn∆ ∈ Sn(yn,wn), then from the definition of
Sn(y
n,wn), we have
PXn∆|yn,wn(xˆ
n
∆) ≥ 2−n(H(X∆|YW)+γ).
Thus, we have
1 ≥
∑
xˆn∆∈Sn(y
n,wn)
PXn∆|Y nWn(x
n
∆|yn,wn)
≥ |Sn(yn,wn)|2−n(H(X∆|YW)+γ).
Hence, we have
|Sn(yn,wn)| ≤ 2n(H(X∆|YW)+γ). (A· 6)
From Eqs.(A· 3)–(A· 6), we upper bound Pr{E(1)n } as
Pr{E(1)n } ≤
∫
Yn
pY n(y
n)
∑
(xn∆,w
n)∈Xn∆×W
n
A
×Wn
B
PXn∆Wn|yn(x
n
∆,w
n)
2n(H(X∆|YW)+γ)
|MA| dy
n
≤ 2
n(H(X∆|YW)+γ)
|MA|
= 2− log |MA|2n(H(X∆|YW)+γ), (A· 7)
which exponentially tends to 0 as n → ∞ if
1
n
log |MA| > H(X∆|YW) + γ.
Since the decoding error probability Pr{Xn∆ 6=
ψ¯n(ϕ¯n(X
n
∆), Y
n,Wn)} of randomly chosen code tends
to 0 as n → ∞, there exist at least one pair of an
encoder and a decoder such that the decoding error
probability Pr{Xˆn∆ 6= Xn∆} tends to 0 as n→∞.
Appendix B: Proof of lemma 2
In this Appendix, we will show the proof of lemma 2.
In section B.1, we introduce a two-universal hash fam-
ily, which is used for computation of a secret key. In
section B.2, we define the security of the protocol in the
sense of the variational distance, and we show the re-
lation between the security of the protocol in the sense
of the variational distance and the condition Eq. (2).
This relation implies that if the security of the proto-
col in the sense of the variational distance is satisfied,
then the condition Eq. (2) is satisfied. In section B.3,
we relate the size |S| of a secret key S and the size
|MA × MB| of public messages M = (MA,MB) to
the security of the protocol, and we show that if we
set 1
n
ln |S| < H(X∆Y∆|ZWAWB) − 1n ln |MA ×MB|,
then there exists at least one hash function f that sat-
isfy Eq. (2) for sufficiently large n.
For the simplicity of notation, we denotes
the integral over Rn as
∫
unless otherwise speci-
fied, and we abbreviates PRnMn|ZnWn(·, ·|zn,wn) as
PRnMn|zn,wn(·, ·). The variational distance ‖P1 − P2‖
between the probability distribution P1 and P2 on V is
defined as
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‖P1 − P2‖ :=
∑
v∈V
|P1(v)− P2(v)|. (A· 8)
B.1 two-universal hash family
In order to extract an almost secret string (secret key
S) from a partially secret strings (a pair Rn of random
variablesXn∆ and Y
n
∆), we use a two-universal hash fam-
ily F . A set F of functions f : Xn∆ ×Yn∆ → S is said to
be a two-universal hash family if we have
PF
({f ∈ F | f(rn) = f(r′n)}) ≤ 1|S| (A· 9)
for any rn 6= r′n ∈ Xn∆×Yn∆, where F denotes a random
variable on F and PF denotes the uniform distribution
on F . For given Eve’s received signals zn ∈ Rn and re-
liability information wn ∈ WA ×WB, the jointly con-
ditional distribution PSM|zn,wn(s,m) of a secret key
S = f(Rn) and public message M is given by
PSM|zn,wn(s,m) :=
∑
rn∈f−1(s)
PRnM|zn,wn(r
n,m)
= PRnM|zn,wn(f
−1(s),m),
where f−1(s) := {rn ∈ Xn∆ × Yn∆ | f(rn) = s} is the
subset of a set Xn∆ × Yn∆ such that f(rn) = s. Note
that since S depends on a hash function f , it should
be referred as Sf . But, we use the above notation for
convenience in this paper.
B.2 The security of the protocol in the sense of the
variational distance
In order to prove lemma 2, we define the security of the
protocol in the sense of the variational distance in this
section. If a secret key S is independent of Eve’s infor-
mation and its distribution PS is close to the uniform
distribution PS¯ on S, we decide that the secret key S
is secure in the sense of the variational distance. In the
other words, we define the security of the protocol as
∆f :=
∫
pZn(z
n)
∑
wn∈Wn
A
×Wn
B
PWn|zn(w
n)
‖PSM|zn,wn − PS¯ × PM|zn,wn‖dzn, (A· 10)
where PM|zn,wn is the marginal distribution of
PSM|zn,wn , and PS¯ × PM|zn,wn is the product distri-
bution of PS¯ and PM|zn,wn
As an extension of [16, Lemma 1] to continuous
random variable, the following lemma relates the se-
curity of the protocol in the sense of the variational
distance to the security of the protocol in the sense of
the entropy shown in Eq. (2).
Lemma 3 The conditional entropy H(S|ZnWnMF )
is lower bounded by
H(S|ZnWnMF ) ≥ (1− Ef [∆f ]) ln |S|
−Ef [∆f ] log 1
Ef [∆f ]
. (A· 11)
Note that sinceWn = (WnA ,W
n
B) andM = (MA,MB),
the conditional entropy H(S|ZnWnMF ) equivalent
to H(S|ZnWnAWnBMA,MBF ) in Eq. (11). From this
lemma, if Ef [∆f ] is sufficiently small, a secret key S is
secure in the sense of the entropy.
Proof. Let
∆f,m,zn,wn := ‖PS|m,zn,wn − PS¯‖. (A· 12)
Then, we can rewrite ∆f as
∆f =
∫
pZn(z
n)
∑
m,wn
PMWn|zn(m,w
n)∆f,m,zn,wn dz
n (A· 13)
For given zn ∈ Rn, wn ∈ WnA × WnB, and m ∈
MA ×MB, we obtain
H(S|M = m, Zn = zn,Wn = wn, F = f)
≥ log |S| −∆f,m,zn,wn log |S|
∆f,m,zn,wn
,
(A· 14)
which follows from the continuity of entropy [15] in the
similar way as [16, Lemma 1].
The second term of Eq. (A· 14) is upper bonded as
follow. Since t log 1
t
is a concave function, we obtain
∑
m,wn
PMWn|zn(m,w
n)∆f,m,zn,wn log
|S|
∆f,m,zn,wn
≤ ∆f,z log |S|
∆f,z
(A· 15)
from Jensen’s inequality for wn,m, where we let
∆f,zn :=
∑
m,wn PMWn|zn(m,w
n)∆f,m,zn,wn . Aver-
aging Eq. (A· 15) over zn, we obtain∫
pZn(z
n)∆f,zn log
|S|
∆f,z
dzn ≤ ∆f log |S|
∆f
(A· 16)
from Jensen’s inequality for zn. Moreover, averaging
Eq. (A· 16) over f , we obtain
Ef
[
∆f log
|S|
∆f
]
≤ Ef [∆f ] log |S|
Ef [∆f ]
(A· 17)
from Jensen’s inequality for f . 
Note that when we use Jensen’s inequality for a
continuous random variable, the condition of absolutely
integrable∫
pZn(z
n)|∆f,zn |dzn <∞ (A· 18)
must be satisfied [17]. In this case, from the fact that
0 ≤ ∆f,zn ≤ 2, this condition is satisfied.
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B.3 The relation between the size of a secret key and
the security of the protocol
The following lemma relates the size |S| of a secret key
S and the size |MA ×MB| of public messages M to
the security of the protocol.
Lemma 4 For the size |S| of a secret key S, the size
|MA×MB| of public messagesM, and the security of
the protocol ∆f , we have
Ef [∆f ]
≤
√
|S||MA ×MB|
2αn
+2
∫
pnZ(z
n)
∑
wn
PWn|zn(w
n)
×PRn|znwn ({rn ∈ Xn∆ × Yn∆ |
− 1
n
logPRn|znwn(r
n) < α
})
dzn, (A· 19)
where Ef denotes expectation for a uniform distribu-
tion on F .
Proof. This proof is based on the techniques in [18,
Chapter 5]. In the following, we will prove
Ef [∆f,zn,wn ]
≤
√
|S||MA ×MB|
2αn
+2PRn|znwn ({rn ∈ Xn∆ × Yn∆ |
− 1
n
logPRn|znwn(r
n) < α
})
, (A· 20)
where
∆f,zn,wn = ‖PSM|znwn − PS¯ × PM|znwn‖, (A· 21)
Averaging Eq. (A· 20) over zn and wn, we obtain
Eq. (A· 19).
For given zn ∈ Rn and wn ∈ WnA ×WnB, we define
the set An ⊂ Xn∆ × Yn∆ as
An :=
{
rn ∈ Xn∆ × Yn∆ | −
1
n
logPRn|znwn(r
n) ≥ α
}
,
and we define the set Acn as the complement of An on
Xn∆ × Yn∆. Then, ∆f,zn,wn for given f ∈ F is upper
bounded by
‖PSM|znwn − PS¯ × PM|znwn‖
=
∑
s,m
|PRnM|znwn(f−1(s),m)
−PS¯(s)PM|znwn(m)| (A· 22)
=
∑
s,m
|PRnM|znwn(f−1(s) ∩ An,m)
−PS¯(s)PM|znwn(An,m)
+PRnM|znwn(f
−1(s) ∩ Acn,m)
−PS¯(s)PM|znwn(Acn,m)| (A· 23)
≤
∑
s,m
hn(s,m) +
∑
s,m
PRnM|znwn(f
−1(s) ∩ Acn,m)
+
∑
s,m
PS¯(s)PRnM|znwn(A
c
n,m) (A· 24)
=
∑
s,m
hn(s,m) + 2PRn|znwn(A
c
n). (A· 25)
where
hn(s,m) = |PRnM|znwn(f−1(s) ∩ An,m)
−PS¯(s)PRnM|znwn(An,m)|. (A· 26)
Eq. (A· 22) follows from the definition of the variational
distance and f−1(s). Eq. (A· 23) follows from the fact
that (f−1(s) ∩ An) ∩ (f−1(s) ∩ Acn) = ∅, f−1(s) =
(f−1(s) ∩ An) ∪ (f−1(s) ∩ Acn), and PM|znwn(m) =
PRnM|znwn(An,m) + PRnM|znwn(A
c
n,m). Eq. (A· 24)
follows from the triangle inequality. Eq. (A· 25) follows
from the fact that ∪s∈Sf−1(s) = Xn∆×Yn∆. By regard-
ing the first term in Eq. (A· 25) as an inner product,
and by using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we can
upper bound the first term in Eq. (A· 25) by∑
s,m
hn(s,m)
≤
√
|S||MA ×MB|
∑
s,m
hn(s,m)2 (A· 27)
Furthermore, we can rewrite the inside of the root
of Eq. (A· 27) as∑
s,m
hn(s,m)
2
=
∑
s,m
{
PRnM|znwn(f
−1(s) ∩ An,m)2
−2PRnM|znwn(f−1(s) ∩ An,m)
PS¯(s)PRnM|znwn(An,m)
+PS¯(s)
2PRnM|znwn(An,m)
2
}
=
∑
s,m
PRnM|znwn(f
−1(s) ∩ An,m)2
−
∑
m
1
|S|PRnM|znwn(An,m)
2, (A· 28)
where Eq. (A· 28) follows from the fact that
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PS¯(s) =
1
|S| and
∑
s PRnM|znwn(f
−1(s) ∩ An,m) =
PRnM|znwn(An,m). Then, we can rewrite the first
term of Eq. (A· 28) as
∑
s,m
PRnM|znwn(f
−1(s) ∩ An,m)2
=
∑
s,m
∑
rn,r′n∈f−1(s)∩An
PRnM|znwn(r
n,m)
PRnM|znwn(r
′n,m)
=
∑
m
∑
rn,r′n∈An
δf(rn),f(r′n)PRnM|znwn(r
n,m)
PRnM|znwn(r
′n,m), (A· 29)
where δf(rn),f(r′n) is Kronecker’s delta. On the other
hand, we can rewrite the second term of Eq. (A· 28) as
∑
m
1
|S|PRnM|znwn(An,m)
2
=
∑
m
∑
rn,r′n∈An
1
|S|PRnM|znwn(r
n,m)
PRnM|znwn(r
′n,m). (A· 30)
Thus, averaging Eq. (A· 28) over f , we obtain
∑
m
∑
rn,r′n∈An
Ef
[
δf(rn),f(r′n) − 1|S|
]
PRnM|znwn(r
n,m)PRnM|znwn(r
′n,m). (A· 31)
Since f is chosen from a universal-hash-family, we ob-
tain
Ef
[
δf(rn),f(r′n) − 1|S|
]
≤
{
1 for rn = r′
n
0 for rn 6= r′n
from its definition (shown in Eq. (A· 9)). Thus,
Eq. (A· 31) is upper bounded by
∑
m
∑
rn∈An
PRnM|znwn(r
n,m)PRnM|znwn(r
n,m)
≤
∑
m
∑
rn∈An
PRnM|znwn(r
n,m)
1
2αn
(A· 32)
≤
∑
rn,m
PRnM|znwn(r
n,m)
1
2αn
(A· 33)
=
1
2αn
, (A· 34)
where Eq. (A· 32) follows from the fact that
PRnM|znwn(r
n,m) ≤ PRn|znwn(rn) ≤ 12αn for any
rn ∈ An. Since the root function
√· is concave func-
tion, by combining Eqs.(A· 22)–(A· 32) and averaging
over f , we obtain
Ef [∆f,zn,wn ]
≤
√
|S||MA ×MB|
∑
s,m
hn(s,m)2
+2PRn|znwn({rn ∈ Xn∆ × Yn∆ |
− 1
n
logPRn|znwn(r
n) < α})
≤
√
|S||MA ×MB|
2αn
+2PRn|znwn({rn ∈ Xn∆ × Yn∆ |
− 1
n
logPRn|znwn(r
n) < α}). (A· 35)

Corollary 1 Suppose that we set 1
n
log |S| =
H(R|ZW) − 1
n
log |MA ×MB| − 2δ, Ef [∆f ] is expo-
nentially small for sufficiently large n.
Proof. Suppose that we set α = H(R|ZW) − δ
for δ > 0, the second term of Eq. (A· 19) exponen-
tially tends to 0 as n → ∞ by using the Chernoff
bound [15]. On the other hand, suppose that we
set 1
n
log |S| = H(R|ZW) − 1
n
log |MA × MB| − 2δ,
the first term of Eq. (A· 19) is e−δn and tends to 0
as n → ∞. Thus, suppose that we set 1
n
log |S| =
H(R|ZW)− 1
n
log |MA ×MB| − 2δ, Ef [∆f ] exponen-
tially tends to 0 as n→∞. 
If Ef [∆f ] is exponentially small, then the security of
the protocol in the sense of entropy is guaranteed by
lemma 3. From this fact and corollary 5, suppose that
we set 1
n
log |S| < H(X∆Y∆|ZWAWB) − 1n log |MA ×MB|, Eq. (2) is satisfied for sufficiently large n.
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